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Most of the research on Bayesian reasoning aims to answer theoretical questions about
the extent to which people are able to update their beliefs according to Bayes’ Theorem,
about the evolutionary nature of Bayesian inference, or about the role of cognitive
abilities in Bayesian inference. Few studies aim to answer practical, mainly health-related
questions, such as, “What does it mean to have a positive test in a context of cancer
screening?” or “What is the best way to communicate amedical test result so a patient will
understand it?”. This type of research aims to translate empirical findings into effective
ways of providing risk information. In addition, the applied research often adopts the
paradigms and methods of the theoretically-motivated research. But sometimes it works
the other way around, and the theoretical research borrows the importance of the
practical question in the medical context. The study of Bayesian reasoning is relevant
to risk communication in that, to be as useful as possible, applied research should
employ specifically tailored methods and contexts specific to the recipients of the risk
information. In this paper, we concentrate on the communication of the result of medical
tests and outline the epidemiological and test parameters that affect the predictive power
of a test—whether it is correct or not. Building on this, we draw up recommendations
for better practice to convey the results of medical tests that could inform health policy
makers (What are the drawbacks of mass screenings?), be used by health practitioners
and, in turn, help patients to make better and more informed decisions.
Keywords: Bayesian reasoning, positive predictive value, risk communication, Bayesian textbook tasks, medical
tests
Introduction
Research in Bayesian reasoning started with the pioneering work of Casscells (1978) and
Eddy (1982) and has consisted mostly in asking participants about the trustworthiness
of positive results in screening tests, i.e., the positive predictive value (PPV) of
medical tests. The PPV of a test expresses the proportion of people affected by a
medical condition relative to the total number of positive test results. Textbook
Bayesian problems (as well as medical tests’ brochures, informed consent forms, etc.)
commonly present information about the prevalence of a condition (i.e., proportion
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of population with the condition), the sensitivity of a test
(i.e., probability that a test detects the presence of the medical
condition) and its false-positive rate (i.e., probability that the
test detects a medical condition that is not present), and ask
participants to assess the positive predictive value of the test
(PPV). The following example (Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995)
is a widely used Bayesian reasoning problem:
The probability of breast cancer is 1% for women aged forty who
participate in routine screening. If a woman has breast cancer, the
probability is 80% that she will get a positive mammogram. If a
woman does not have breast cancer, the probability is 9.6% that she
will also get a positive mammogram. A woman in this age group
has a positive mammogram in a routine screening. What is the
probability that she actually has breast cancer?
To answer the question of PPV correctly—the probability
of having the medical condition given a positive test result,
formalized as p(H|D)—participants need to understand the
structure of the problem and extract the key probabilistic
pieces of information outlined above: the prevalence of the
condition [p(H) = 1%], and the test characteristics—sensitivity
(p(D|H)= 80%) and false-positive rate (p(D|∼H)=9.6%).
In this example, to adequately answer the question (PPV), a
participant (or a patient) would need to combine all the above
information in a specific way, following the Bayes’ formula as
displayed in Equation (1).
p (H|D) =
p (H) p (D|H)
p (H) p (D|H) + p (∼H) p (D| ∼ H)
(1)
Bayesian problems vary in complexity depending on the format
of presentation of the probabilistic information (e.g., natural
frequencies vs. single-event probability) and based on the
structure and content of the narrative (Barbey and Sloman, 2007;
Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007; Lesage et al., 2013; McNair and
Feeney, 2014). There are ways to simplify the computational
demands: using absolute reference class (e.g., frequencies or
chances with a natural sampling) and specifying the number
of positive tests p(D). In this case, with only two pieces of
information, p(D&H)—the chances of having a positive result
and the disease at the same time—and p(D)–the chances of a
positive test—we can proceed using a simplified version of the
Bayes’ theorem outlined in Equation (1). Equation (2) could be
seen as a simple case of Laplacian probability (Laplace, 1810):
ratio of “favored events” to total possible events (i.e., ratio of the
number of correct classifications to the total positive results in
the test).
p (H|D) =
p (D & H)
p (D)
(2)
Researchers have found that the ability of people to solve
Bayesian problems depends greatly on the way the information
is conveyed, ranging from ∼5% in the first case (1), to up
to ∼50% in the latter (2) (see Gigerenzer and Hoffrage, 1995
for a very detailed explanation encompassing the difference
between Equations 1 and 2). Manipulating features of the
textbook Bayesian problems such as visual representations
(Brase, 2009; Sirota et al., 2014b), clarification of the causal
structure (Krynski and Tenenbaum, 2007; McNair and Feeney,
2014), and information structure (Barbey and Sloman, 2007)
can also improve reasoning performance in some circumstances.
Individual differences also account for some performance
variance over and above the actual content of the task, such as,
for example, cognitive reflection ability and numeracy (Sirota and
Juanchich, 2011; Johnson and Tubau, 2013, 2015; Lesage et al.,
2013; Sirota et al., 2014a).
Furthermore, the way we currently study Bayesian reasoning
may not be the best. It has been argued that research focused
on how people update their beliefs or probabilities, to improve
our knowledge about how the mind works, assesses ability more
akin to statistical inference than to Bayesian reasoning (Mandel,
2014). But, more specifically, if we are interested in the best
way to convey medical information to patients, we need to
adopt a more flexible approach than the mechanical application
of textbook problems. Indeed, most of the research outlined
above used textbook problems to study the theoretical basis of
Bayesian reasoning (Baratgin and Politzer, 2006), often using the
presence of this type of information in medical contexts as a
testimony of the importance of the research. The focus has been
on ways to improve people’s understanding via the use of pictorial
aids, causal structure, computational simplification, clarification
of the structure of the problem and boundary conditions
(e.g., individual differences in cognitive processing), sometimes
forgetting the real needs of the applied side of our research.
The importance of finding better ways to communicate
medical risks has become a common motivating factor for
a fair share of the Bayesian reasoning literature, given the
real world impact of this field and the fact that only a few
people can actually understand this kind of information as it is
commonly presented (see Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer, 2001; Juslin
et al., 2011; Pighin et al., 2015a). Even health-care professionals
often have difficulties understanding probabilistic information1
(Ghosh et al., 2004; Gigerenzer et al., 2007). Bayesian reasoning
research has shown that people’s understanding of probabilistic
problems depends on the complexity of the structure of the
problem, the computation required and their own cognitive skills
and thinking styles. However, those principles rarely transcend
the basic research walls. In clinical practice, what we know
about Bayesian reasoning is not generally applied to improve
the way of communicating risk. As a consequence, people have
to understand their health practitioners’ explanations, “informed
consent” or medical tests brochures, where the information given
is poorly structured, incomplete and simply often beyond their
capabilities. The example below2 shows a prenatal test brochure
for Down Syndrome. As far as we have seen, this is fairly
representative of the prenatal tests’ brochures available online.
The explanation provided in the brochure is a mix of frequencies
and relative probabilities from which it is very difficult to derive
the positive predictive value of the test.
1For example, Gigerenzer et al. (2007) show that the number of physicians able to
solve a multiple choice breast cancer screening problem was 21%, slightly below
chance.
2From http://www.prenatest.ca/en/Harmony-Prenatal-Test-Brochure.pdf.
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It is estimated that trisomy 21 is present in 1 out of every 800 births
in Canada.
It is estimated that trisomy 18 is present in approximately 1 out
of every 6,000 births.
It is estimated that trisomy 13 is present in approximately 1 out
of every 16,000 newborns.
The Harmony Test has been shown to have detection rates of up
to 99 % and false positive rates as low as 0.1 % for trisomy 21, 18,
and 13 (...)
In this example, if a couple expecting a baby wanted to
understand what a positive result in the test meant, they would
have to deal with a very complex calculation. The information
given can be matched to Equation (1)—assuming you know that,
p(∼H) = 1-p(H). For the trisomy 21 case it would translate into
Equation (3):
p
(
Trisomy 21 | + test
)
=
(A)
1 out of 800 × 99%
(
1 out of 800×99%
)
+
(
799 out of 800×0.1%
) =
(B)
0.123
0.123+ 0.0998
= 0.55 (3)
If the parents completed Equation (3)3 they would realize the
probability of having a child affected with a trisomy 21, 18, or
13 given a positive test result, is, respectively, 55%, 14% and 6%
(see Navarrete et al., 2014 for a more detailed account), likely to
be below their expectations, given a generally shared high regard
for medical tests (Gigerenzer et al., 2009).
In a medical context, it is important that people understand
the risks, the pros and cons of undertaking a test and how to
interpret the result afterwards. The role of the medical personnel
is vital and, although the ethical dimension and other issues
involved are beyond the scope of this article, we want to recognize
their complexity. In any case, we could probably agree that it
is important that patients are given the possibility of reaching a
sufficient level of understanding to give a truly informed consent.
Why then are we forcing participants and patients to deal with a
non-trivial set of information, and then to perform a calculation
generally too difficult for them? In most cases this translates
into patients or doctors being unable to provide an informed
consent and to blindly trusting medical tests or falling prey to
bogus medical tests, and in uninformed politicians implementing
policies promoting mass screenings for low prevalence diseases,
where the positive predictive value is also low (e.g., as for the
Trisomy 13 for which a positive test identifies correctly the
Syndrome in only 6 cases out of 100). This can result in negative
consequences, costing life and money (Gigerenzer et al., 2007).
But why are mass screenings less useful than targeted
screenings? To be able to understand the result of a medical test,
3To be able to give a reference point, we asked 66 people to solve the above two
Equations 3(A) and 3(B) through the web platform Amazon’s Mechanical Turk,
and the average accuracy correct response was 21 and 53%, respectively. That is,
even when we give people the data of the brochure within the required formula,
less than 25% are able to correctly solve it.
one needs to take into account two different and inter-related
sets of information. The first set of information relies on the
test’s characteristics: its sensitivity and false positive rate. The
second set of information has to do with the disease itself, more
specifically its prevalence. The usefulness and trustworthiness
of a test critically depends on the prevalence of the medical
condition it is seeking to detect, and this depends on the reference
group used (Baldessarini et al., 1983).
Prevalence,– and its relationship with false positives– is
pivotal and very often misunderstood when interpreting the
meaning of a positive result in a test. As prevalence decreases—as
is the case in mass screenings—even near perfect tests produce a
large number of false positives, and hence, a low PPV. Several
authors have warned about the dangers of mass screenings
and their negative consequences, such as the high cost of false
positives in psychological and monetary terms (Christiansen
et al., 2000; Gigerenzer et al., 2007; Navarrete et al., 2014).
It is important to keep in mind that prevalence is not a
characteristic of a test but of the population to whom the test
is given. For example, the prevalence of certain chromosomal
aberrations in fetuses is related to maternal age and gestation
time (Nicolaides, 2004). The exact same test would “work” a lot
better—i.e., have a higher PPV—in older pregnant women than
in younger ones. Specifically, the rates of prevalence range from
1 out of 1000 for 20 year old mothers up to 1 in 38 for 42 year old
mothers (Nicolaides, 2004, p. 18). That means that the combined
test reliability, used commonly as a screening procedure, goes
from a 2% PPV when used in young mothers to 34% PPV when
used in a relatively high risk group. Still a far cry from a reliable
test, but a change with dramatic consequences given the default
recommended assessment in the case of a positive result, and its
associated risks (Navarrete et al., 2014).
To combine all available information, one should follow
Equation (2): ratio of the number of correct classifications to
the total positive results in the test. The number of correct
classifications will always be close to 1 as the prevalence is usually
presented in a standard way—1 out of X (but see Pighin et al.,
2015b for some related issues)—and the sensitivity is usually close
enough to 100%. On the other hand, the denominator magnitude
will depend on the number of false positives and theX term of the
prevalence (1 out of X). Imagine we have a test with a 0.1% rate of
false positives that aims to detect a relatively common condition
affecting 1 in 100 individuals (see Equation 4). The number of
false positives would be calculated multiplying the 99 healthy
individuals by 0.1%, that is, 99× 0.001=∼ 0.099. Using Equation
(2), this would translate into a PPV of 0.91, or a 91% chance of
having the medical condition given a positive test result.
p (H|D) =
p (D&H)
p (D)
=
1
1+ 0.099
= 0.91 (4)
Unfortunately, tests are not always so reliable, nor are the
tested medical conditions so common. According to the EU
regulations4, most patients suffer from diseases affecting 1 in
100,000. Test reliability and prevalence can dramatically reduce
4From http://ec.europa.eu/health/rare_diseases/policy/index_en.htm: “In EU
countries, any disease affecting fewer than five people in 10,000 is considered rare.
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the ability of a test to identify a medical condition. For example, a
test with the same rate of false positives (0.1%) that aims to detect
a disease with a lower incidence, such as of 1 in 10,000 would
result in a much lower PPV: 0.09, or 9%, as seen in Equation (5).
p (H|D) =
p (D&H)
p (D)
=
1
1+ 9.99
= 0.09 (5)
The previous two examples show how the PPV of a test can
change from 91 to 9% simply because of a lower incidence of
a medical condition (from 1 in 100 to 1 in 10,000). In a mass
screening campaign, the incidence of amedical condition is lower
than in a targeted screening campaign, lowering dramatically the
reliability of the test results.
Of course, as often happens, if a medical test is not as reliable
as the one used in the two examples above (100% sensitivity,
and 0.1% false positive rate), a low positive predictive value
appears even with common medical conditions. For example, see
in Equation (6) the computation of the positive predictive value
of a test aiming to detect a condition with a prevalence of 1 in
100, and a false positive rate as low as 1%. When the rate of false
positives increases by 0.9%, the positive predictive value of the
test decreases by 40%, dropping from 90 to 50%. In this context,
a person receiving a positive test has only a 50% chance of actually
having the condition.
p (H|D) =
p (D&H)
p (D)
=
1
1+ 0.99
= 0.5 (6)
That number may seem small, but it translates into approximately 246,000 people
throughout the EU’s 28 member countries. Most patients suffer from even rarer
diseases affecting one person in 100,000 or more. It is estimated that today in
the EU, 5-8,000 distinct rare diseases affect 6–8% of the population—between 27
and 36 million people.” The PPV for a test with 100% sensitivity and a 0.1% false
positive rate trying to detect a 1 in 2000 condition is 50%.
With all these examples, we are not implying that screening tests
should not be trusted. We intend to outline the factors needed to
be considered when using and interpreting medical test results.
As we have seen, low prevalence rates, and their interaction
with false positive rates, are generally guilty of decreasing
the positive predictive value of a test: Figure 1 provides an
illustration of this. The variability of positive predictive values
of medical tests, according to the characteristics of the test and
the prevalence of the condition, makes it hard for patients to
decide whether to take the test and to assess their chances of
having a condition when they test positive, particularly when
the information given to them is generally too complicated to
understand.
Given the need of facilitating the patient’s assessment and
decision making powers, different solutions can be offered.
Further medical research to improve the present tests and
decrease their false positive rates is obviously a very important
and necessary path. Testing only people in higher risk groups
and avoiding mass screenings as much as possible or, at least,
making their limitations clear, is a critical necessity given the
reality of the medical tests available and their trustworthiness for
diagnosing rare conditions. Of course, increasing public health
literacy should be traversal to these and any other alternatives
available (Gigerenzer, 2015).
Nonetheless, one important aspect not covered in the above
options is that we need to find better ways to communicate
medical risks, starting with using the information obtained
through empirical research in medical practice. For those of
us interested in improving the way we convey medical risks,
focusing research on what real patients need is vital. In the real
world, when receiving medical test results or reading informed
consents, people are confronted with probabilistic information
generally too complex to be understood, let alone calculated.
We need to avoid altogether the classical triad (specificity, false
FIGURE 1 | Positive predictive value for three tests with a 100% sensitivity according to the rate of false positive (A) 0.1%, (B) 1%, and (C) 2%, and to
the prevalence of the condition.
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positive rate and prevalence) if we want to improve people’s
chances of understanding test results and informed consents, and
of playing a more active role in shared decision making. It is
also important to acknowledge that there exist teams focusing
on helping health practitioners better communicate risk and
patients better understand risks (e.g., Reyna et al., 2009; Garcia-
Retamero et al., 2010; Gigerenzer, 2014). However, theoretical
research seems to still have the lion’s share in Bayesian reasoning
and we would suggest further harnessing these teams’ work to
derive simple and effective guidelines to communicate medical
test results.
Our proposal, then, is to present information about the PPV,
and specifically, how trustworthy a positive or a negative result
in each particular test really is for the individual: that is, the
PPV for the test relative to the risk group the person belongs
to. Using epidemiological factors (such as age in the prenatal
screening example above, a list of common behaviors for each
risk group, family history, etc.) we could help people assign
themselves to a specific risk group. An example would be to
present something akin to one of the sections of Figures 1A–C,
making clear which epidemiological factors, risk behaviors, etc.
are associated with each of the prevalence or risk groups. In
prenatal screening, this would depend, amongst other factors,
on the age of the mother to be. In a mass screening context,
this approach could translate to most people (low risk people)
avoiding getting tested for rare conditions, as the PPV for them
would be extremely low. Prevalence is a characteristic of the
disease or of the group tested and its risk factors, and not of
the test, and we must stop ignoring this fact. This would help
people distinguish between good and bad tests and make for
more informed decisions.
To sum up, the goal of this article is to call on the scientific
community studying Bayesian reasoning to join efforts and focus
further on finding better ways to present medical information.
Such research could inform policy makers’ decisions (specifically
helping them understand why mass screenings are less useful
than targeted screenings) and be used by health staff to enable
patients to make better informed decisions related to their
health. One possibility is to find good ways to assign people
to risk groups and to present information about tests relative
to these risk groups, but other options surely exist. Of course,
it is important to empirically confirm that people really do
better with this new way of presenting the information (e.g.,
they do understand the pros and cons of the combination
of tests suggested in prenatal screening), and to assess the
medical consequences of such trials. This call for further applied
research is not unique and joins other initiatives to avoid risk
miscommunication (e.g., fact-box for breast cancer screening
pamphlets as suggested by Gigerenzer, 2014). Most people would
agree: misinformation needs to stop.We have the chance to work
toward this goal together.
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